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Introduction
The fourth of January 1984 marked not only 36 years of independence of the Union of Burma from Britain, but also the anniversary of just as many years of civil war, strife, and insurgency. Since 1948, more than a dozen rebel armies ? claiming to represent one national minority or another ? have been fighting to obtain autonomy or, in certain cases, complete secession from the Union.
The most crucial of all these national rebellions is probably the one being fought in Shan State, where secessionist rebels have been up in arms since 1958 and where the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) for the last fifteen years has had its main area of operation.
Unfortunately, however, although the Shan question has attracted the attention of the media in the outside world, little interest has been shown regarding the origins and the roots of this conflict. Indeed, the subject has been treated superficially with the emphasis on sensation alists aspects such as the booming Shan opium trade, the drug runners, the war-lords and the "Opium Kings" of the Golden
Triangle, of which Shan State forms a part. For it is in this motley mosaic of self-made military commanders, mercenaries, communist as well as nationalist insurgents, contraband traders and assorted outlaws that between 400 and 700 tons of opium are harvested every year. A big part of this is refined into heroin or morphine and smuggled out to various destinations in the world.
The present anarchy in Shan State is a direct result of centuries of mutual distrust between the Shans and their Burmese neighbours, and the problems go far back in the history of the region. The word "Shan" is actually a corruption of "Siam" or "Syam" and is the name given to them by the Burmese; the letter "m" becomes "n" as a final consonant in the Burmese language. The Shans call themselves "Dtai" (sometimes spelled "Dai" or " Tai Looking to the character of the country lying between the Salween and the Mekong, it was certain to be the refuge of all the discon tent and outlawry of Burma. Unless it was ruled by a government not only loyal and friendly to us, but thoroughly strong and effi cient, this region would become a base for the operations of every brigand leader or pretender where they might muster their fol lowers and hatch their plots. ... To those responsible for the peace of Burma, such a prospect was not pleasant.1
To avoid the emergence of an uncontrollable buffer state between the two colonial powers, the British extended their Burmese conquest to the Shan States, which were "pacified" over the years 1885-90.
Another main reason that the British decided to precede the French and keep them at bay on the other side of the Mekong was that the The Burmese nationalists had been taken in by the Japanese war cry '4 Asia to the Asians!". However, the BIA was not allowed to enter the Shan States or any other frontier areas. The Japanese, like the British before them, treated the Shan States as a separate political entity. They even handed over the biggest of them, Kengtung (12,400 square miles) along with the smaller state of Mong Pan (2,988 square miles) to Thailand, which was allied with Japan during the war. Later, when the group led by Aung San realized that Japan was interested only in a puppet regime in Rangoon and not in true independence for Burma, the BIA contacted its former enemies, the British, and was reorganized into the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL). resistance because the rebels were their own people; but they could not support them either. Open confrontation with the Union Government might lead to a large-scale war in the Shan States. There was also a certain amount of distrust between the Saohpas and some of the young rebels who, influenced by revolutionary ideas, were opposed to the old leaders ? symbols of a feudal society they wanted to change. U Nu returned to power in April 1960 after almost nineteen months of military rule. He had won the general election earlier that year as the leader of the Pyidaungsu (Union League Party). He pro claimed that he would operate * 'in strict compliance with the principles of democracy". But dissension broke out within the Pyidaungsu and it appeared that U Nu's new party would split apart. To add more prob lems to the already weak and troubled U Nu government, the Shan leader, Sao Shwe Thaike, submitted a proposal to loosen the federal structure of the constitution.
In The fast rolling opium bandwagon was further oiled by the intro duction of the Burmese Way to Socialism following General Ne Win's coup of 1962. All businesses and banks (foreign and other wise), shops, industries, factories, etc, were nationalized, and business and trade by individuals and private concerns came to a dead stop. Naturally, in such an economic vacuum there arose a black market economy which for opium traffickers was a boon as they, and only they, were equipped to exploit this sad situation.
Opium was bought by them at very low price from ragged cultiva tors, transported in armed caravans to the border and refined into heroin. And on the return trip to get more opium, Thai goods and commodities were taken up and sold in Shan State at very high profit ? thus, a killing was made both ways, at least thrice yearly. Rather than creating socialism, the Burmese Way to Social ism in effect delivered the economy into the hands of the opium traffickers. As such, opium became the only viable crop and medium of exchange. While other groups got more and more involved in opium, and the trade became an end in itself, the SSA adhered to its initial nationalis tic ambitions. As a result, the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) was born on 16 August 1971. It developed into the only political organiza tion with national support across Shan State.45 A new cultural awaken ing had taken place in Shan State. Large numbers of students had gone to the villages, where they taught the rural folk to read and write Shan, despite the government's efforts to discourage them from doing so. Some of these "barefoot teachers" joined the rebellion and brought with them new ideas to the SSA's jungle hideouts. While the original founders of the SSA had been young aristocrats with close Saohpa connections, the newcomers had received their political inspiration from the student movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Taek, located just a few miles inside the Thai border. Supported by planes and helicopter gunships, about a thousand Thai troops fought for several days with the SUA. The attack followed a visit to Burma and Thailand by the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters, Dominic Dicarlo. There had been allegations that Khun Sa had links with the CPB. The arrival of communist opium merchants at the SUA's camps along the Thai border had disturbed the Thai authorities and created the suspicion that Khun Sa was no longer a buffer to counter communist infiltration into Thailand but that he could act as a middleman to help forge ties between the CPB and the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT).51 A year and a half after the fighting in and around Ban Hin Taek, the SUA may be shattered, but it is far from defeated. The SUA has not only managed to rebuild most of its forces, but it seems to be expanding its influence along the Shan-Thai border as well. the past few years and no longer poses any significant immediate threat to Thailand's security. The defeat of the CPT has also freed more than 5,000 paramilitary rangers from actual combat duty in the northeast of Thailand, and it seems likely that these troops will in the future take over the role still being played by Shan rebel groups and other armed bands along the Thai-Burmese border.
The insecure position of the SUA after the battle of Ban Hin Taek has weakened its grip over the Golden Triangle opium trade. However, the trade still continues unabated, but the local opium merchants and 2. The SSA and its allies will ensure that all opium controlled by their armies is burnt under international supervision. The opium will be sold at a price to be negotiated later, but the basis for negotiations should be the Thai border price. 3. The SSA and its allies will attack all opium convoys which are not subject to an agreement based on these proposals. 4 .
In return for these temporary measures, the SSA and its allies will expect help in finding a more permanent solution to the problems We witnessed the spectacle of this frightened and desperate man being surrounded by four KKY officers and being told, in effect, that his life was not his own to live. He was taken back to the camp, but allowed to return the next day with a higher ranking officer to collect his personal effects. A man from the village who had employed him put in a plea on his behalf, saying that he was not fit to be a soldier anymore and was a very good worker. He would cause the KKY no trouble. Our informant left with the officer a little later. We have not seen or heard from him since. Several refugees also told us about the Burmese "resettle ment" or "collectivization"
programme. The Burmese Army will force several small villages to group together, burn or raze build ings left behind (using any salvaged construction material for their own purposes). They then build a fence around the outside of the new settlement, beyond which no one can travel. This makes it easier, according to our informants, for the army to find young men if they need more soldiers and harder for the rebel armies to come and request rice.
We spoke to one man, a zalee (lay scripture reader) who reported on the Burmese campaign to drive all the Shans east of the river Nam Tien over to the west side in order to prevent them from feeding rebel soldiers (this is being carried out under the guise of "collectivization"). Many people so displaced flee to Thailand; this is how we came to know this zalee. The zalee said that people can get permission slips from the Burmese Army to cross back over the river to work in their fields, but they cannot sleep there; they must return to the settlement at night. Some times, the distance to their fields makes this impossible and they must abandon their fields.
On the way home from their fields, the people are often stopped by the Burmese Army and asked if they have seen any Shan rebels. According to the zalee, if they say no, they are beaten. If they say yes, the Burmese demand to be taken to the place where the rebels were seen. If the Burmese actually catch someone tipping the rebel forces, it is likely that he/she will be shot.
Two dramatic and personal stories that have come to attention are as follows:
In In August 1980, one of us spoke with a Shan who had come to
Thailand to find seasonal work. He had to do so because the pos sibility of being forced to serve the Burmese Army (in one of those capacities described above) made it difficult for him to provide support for his family. He had served with the Shan State Army (SSA) for eight years. After leaving them for some time, he was arrested by the Burmese on trumped-up charges; they tortured him by suspending him from the ceiling with ropes tied around his biceps for one whole night. His arms were useless for months afterwards and he had to be fed by someone else.
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